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We aim at disentangling the impact of effort on social emotions and more particularly on envy. 
Thus  we  observe  the  impact  of  effort  on  individual  well-being  and  behaviour.  In  our 
experiment  subjects  are  paired  and  receive  endowments  whether  according  to  their 
performance in a real-effort task or randomly. We focus on subjects placed in situations of 
inferiority and ask them to report their satisfaction level before and after being exposed to 
unflattering  social  comparison.  Finally,  subjects  can  choose  to  reduce  their  opponent’s 
endowment by incurring a personal cost. We convey that the introduction of effort does not 
affect individual well-being and partially subjects’ decisions to reduce others’ income. Subjects 
do not reduce more often their opponent’s endowment but they cut a greater portion of their 
opponent’s  endowment  when  endowments  are  attributed  according  to  individual 
performance. Besides we observe that poor performing subjects are more prone to reduce 
others’ income than high performing ones. We also find evidences suggesting that envy is 
ought to explain reduction decisions engaged by high performing subjects and disappointment 
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The destructive power of envy is perfectly highlighted in Shakespeare’s  Othello. Despite fighting 
loyally for many years under Othello’s commands, Iago learns that Othello prefers to select another 
soldier (Cassio) rather than Iago as his personal lieutenant. Iago aspired for a long time in that 
promotion and secretly expected to be chosen by Othello. Iago is piqued. Envy arises intensively in 
Iago and pushes the latter to plan a Machiavellian vengeance aiming at ruining the life of both 
Othello  and  Cassio.  Despite  the  social  disorder  generated  by  Iago’s  conspiracy,  the  play  ends 
dramatically. Indeed consumed by his envy, Iago kills Emilia (his own wife) and Roderigo (his friend 
and ally), he wounds Cassio (his rival) and succeeds in exerting Othello to kill his wife (Desdemona) 
and to commit suicide. Finally Iago is led away in chains while Cassio becomes governor of Cyprus, 
the position so desired by Iago. In Othello, Shakespeare chooses to picture the extreme and ugly side 
of envy. Indeed, not every episode of envy ends in bloodshed. Envy is a protean emotion, i.e. the 
hostility inherent in envy can take many forms (e.g. nasty looks, sarcastic comments, aggression...).
2 
How Iago’s envy led to such a dramatic end? We argue that effort might explain such an extreme 
issue. Indeed, Iago put a lot of efforts during many years so as to improve his position. When Iago 
realised that all his efforts were invested in vain, this might have amplified his envy exerting Iago to 
behave extremely and showing him the path to crime. Would the play ended identically if Iago 
invested no effort in obtaining a promotion? 
Envy is a social emotion, i.e. envy arises from unfavourable social comparisons (Ben Ze'ev, 1992, 
2000; Celse, 2010; Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2007; Smith and Kim, 2007).
 3 Social comparisons have a 
key role on self-evaluation and self-esteem: they help form the foundations for inferences about the 
self, assess personal abilities, facilitate in identifying what ingredients are required for obtaining 
success or for improving one’s performance and, finally, determine individual satisfaction (Ben Ze'ev, 
2000; Collins, 1996; Festinger, 1954; Heider, 1958; Michalos, 1985; Suls and Wills, 1991). Hence social 
comparisons can enhance (if they lead to a favourable diagnostic, i.e. success or superiority) or 
threaten (if they lead to an unfavourable diagnostic, i.e. failure or inferiority) one self-evaluation and 
self-esteem.  Because  of  their  importance  on  both  self-evaluation  and  self-esteem,  social 
comparisons are connected to emotional and affective states. Collins (1996) states that unfavourable 
social comparisons generate negative emotions and affects (e.g. jealousy, envy) whereas favourable 
ones generate positive emotions and affects (e.g. love, pride). Thus social comparisons generate 
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social emotions. Envy can be roughly sketched as “a disturbing pain excited by the prosperity of 
others” (Aristotle, Rhetorics, Book. II, Chap. IX, 1386b) or as “a negative attitude toward another 
person’s superiority” (Ben Ze'ev, 1992, p. 552). Envy is considered as a negative emotion since it 
includes hostility toward the envied and is acknowledged to be involved in violent actions, severe 
conflicts and for leading to oppositions to social systems (Beckman et al., 2002; Celse, 2009; Foster, 
1972; Glick, 2002; Mui, 1995; Schoeck, 1969; Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2003, 2004).
  
Albeit standard economic theory, based on the Homo Economicus’ concept, states that emotions do 
not affect individuals’ satisfaction and behaviour, empirical evidences suggest the contrary (Bault et 
al., 2008; Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Bosman et al., 2005; Sanfey et al., 2003; van Winden et al., 
2008). Emotions draw growing attention from scholars. In emotion theory, effort is acknowledged to 
play  a  key  role  on  individuals’  emotions  by  modulating  their  intensity.  When  involving  effort, 
emotional reactions are known to be experienced more intensively and to have more incidences on 
individual behaviour (Ben Ze'ev, 2000; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; Wyer and Srull, 1989). Ben 
Ze'ev  (2000)  emphasizes  the  connection  between  effort  and  emotional  intensity  through  the 
following lines: “(...) the more effort we invest in something, the more significant it becomes and the 
more intense is the emotion surrounding it” (p. 141).
4 Wyer and Srull (1989) go further and assume 
that negative emotions are ought to be particularly amplified by effort and even more in situations in 
which efforts are invested in vain. van Dijk et al. (1999) corroborate empirically their hypothesis and 
reveal that the emotions of disappointment and regret are significantly affected by effort. Indeed 
when the subject fails at achieving his objective, the subject feels more disappointed and regrets 
more if he has spent a lot of effort in obtaining his goal. Despite the results brought by van Dijk et al. 
(1999), there still is, to our knowledge, a lack of empirical evidences of a direct connection between 
effort and emotional intensity and also between effort and individual behaviour. Related to this issue 
we can point out papers by Bosman et al. (2005) and Rustichini and Vostroknutov (2010). The former 
observe less destruction of income in a power-to-take game when endowments are earned through 
effort. The latter find that decisions to subtract income from others’ subjects are not affected by how 
endowments  are  attributed;  but  they  suggest  that  individuals  differentiate  inequalities  due  to 
differences  of  effort  from  those  due  to  differences  of  luck.
5 Nevertheless these papers do not 
disentangle the impact of social comparisons, and more precisely on envy, on individual satisfaction 
and behaviour.  
                                                           
4 To illustrate the impact of effort on emotions, consider the following situation: Bob and John are passing a job 
audition. Both really desire to have the job. Bob has prepared the job audition for three weeks whereas John 
has not prepared it. Unfortunately both fail at obtaining the job. John might be pained after failing the job 
audition but his pain is ought to be less intense than the pain experienced by Bob that spent many efforts in 
obtaining the job (see van Dijk et al., 1999). 




Would  Iago  be  more  pained  if  he  was  less  invested  in  getting  that  promotion?  Would  Iago  be 
deterred  from  committing  crimes  if  he  put  fewer  efforts  in  improving  his  position?  We  aim  at 
exploring the direct connection between effort and the intensity of social emotions. Does effort 
weaken or strengthen social emotions? More precisely we focus on the emotion of envy. Does effort 
amplify or reduce envy and its impact on individual well-being and behaviour?
6 We conjecture that 
envy is modulated by effort a nd that the more efforts subjects engage the more intense is the 
emotion and its impact on individual behaviour.  
Using experimental methods, we capture social emotions by exposing subjects to unfavourable social 
comparisons and we measure their impact on  both individual well-being and behaviour. We then 
introduce effort and examine how effort affects the impact of unflattering social comparisons on 
individual well-being and behaviour. To capture the impact of social comparisons on individual well-
being (and so to catch social emotions) , we replicate the method used in  Celse (2009).
7 We ask 
subjects to declare how satisfied they are at two moments: after learning their endowment and after 
learning the higher endowment of the person they are paired with (opponent afterwards). Standard 
economic theory, relying on the  Homo Economicus’ concept, assumes that individual satisfaction 
depends exclusively on the individual level of consumption and leisure (i.e. on individual income). 
Thus  standard  economic  theory  predicts  that  a  subject  would  not  report  different  levels  of 
satisfaction.  However,  if  a  subject  reports  different  levels  of  satisfaction,  the  subject  signals  his 
satisfaction to depend not only on his own situation but also on his opponent’s one. Hence the 
subject is said to experience social emotions. We identify envy when the subject indicates a decrease 
in his satisfaction after being informed of his opponent’s endowment. Then we examine the impact 
of social emotions on individual behaviour by asking to the subject if the latter is willing to reduce his 
opponent’s endowment. We aim at investigating whether a relation between subjects’ reported 
levels  of  satisfaction  (and  reported  envy)  and  subjects’  decisions  to  reduce  their  opponent’s 
endowment exists.  
We argue that envy is modulated by effort albeit effort is not the sole determinant of envy. Envy is 
modulated by other parameters such as the subject-object distance, the self-relevance of the desired 
attribute (i.e. object of envious feelings), the environment, etc... (Ben Ze'ev, 1992, 2000; Celse, 2010; 
Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2007; Smith and Kim, 2007). Previous studies convey that the difference 
between subjects affects individual behaviour. Abbink et al. (2008) and Celse (2009) find that as 
inequalities between subjects increase, subjects undertake less destructive decisions. Thus we also 
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investigate  the  role  of  inequalities  between  subjects’  endowments  on  individual  well-being  and 
behaviour.  
We observe that whereas the introduction of effort does not affect subjects’ well-being, it affects 
partially their behaviour. First, whether endowments are attributed randomly or through effort, most 
subjects report changes, more precisely negative changes, in their satisfaction after exposure to 
social  comparisons.  Then  we  do  not  observe  more  reduction  decisions  when  endowments  are 
attributed according to effort but subjects cut a significantly higher fraction of their opponent’s 
endowment when endowments are given according to each effort. Finally, individual performance 
modulates subjects’ decisions to reduce income: the higher the individual performance, the lower 
the probability for a subject to reduce his opponent’s endowment.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the related literature on 
the impacts of effort. As we rely on experimental methods, section 3 provides a description of the 
experimental protocol we use in the paper. We detail our research hypotheses in section 4. Section 5 
is devoted to introduce our results. Whereas section 6 offers a discussion, the last section concludes.  
2. Related literature 
 
In this section, we present briefly the few experiments focusing on the impact of effort on emotions 
or negative behaviour (e.g. reducing income, damaging others’ situations). Whereas the impact of 
effort has received much attention in other domains (e.g. contribution to public good, sharing a fixed 
sum in an Ultimatum game...), there are few studies dealing on how effort affects emotions and 
more precisely negative emotions. 
The study by van Dijk et al. (1999) is the closest relative to our research question. The authors find 
empirical support to the impact of effort on the intensity of disappointment and regret. They ask 
subjects to react to hypothetical scenarios involving a protagonist trying to achieve a certain state or 
to obtain a certain good. In one version the protagonist made huge efforts to fulfil his objective 
whereas in another version the protagonist was less involved. Subjects are told to report how the 
protagonist would feel after being informed that he failed in reaching his goal. van Dijk et al. (1999) 
convey that subjects report the protagonist to feel more disappointed and to regret more when the 
latter invested many efforts in vain.  
Although they do not focus on envy, one can point out the study by Bosman et al. (2005). The 




objective, they compare subjects’ behaviour in a power-to-take game when subjects played with 
earned  endowments  (i.e.  earned  through  real-effort)  and  when  they  played  with  endowments 
allocated  by  the  experimenter.
8 The  power-to-take  game  involves  a  dyadic  relation. The take 
authority (   thereafter) receives an income      and is associated to a responder (   afterwards) 
with an income     . The game consists of two stages. In the first stage,    decides on a take rate 
         , which corresponds to the part of   ’s income left after the second stage that will be 
transferred  to   .  In  the  second  stage,  after  being  informed  on  the  value  of  ,    decides  on 
          , which corresponds to the part of      that will be destroyed. Thus the payoff for    is 
equal to                     and the payoff for    is thus equal to                   . Respondents 
are asked, after their decision, to report their emotions on a list including several emotions. Bosman 
et al. (2005) observe less destruction of one’s endowment when endowments are attributed through 
effort  than  by  the  experimenter.  They  find  that  whether  endowments  are  earned  or  not,  the 
probability of destruction depends significantly and positively on the take rates (i.e. the higher the 
take rate, the higher the probability to destroy one’s endowment). They also find that the probability 
of destroying is higher when endowments are given by the experimenter than when they are earned. 
Besides emotions behind responders’ destruction decisions are different depending on the nature of 
their endowment. Nevertheless as    faces decisions from   , Bosman et al. (2005) focus on how 
emotions generated by others’ decisions are affected by effort. They cannot isolate the impact of 
social comparisons from the impact of   ’s decisions on emotions and individual behaviour.  
Recently Rustichini and Vostroknutov (2010) want to investigate experimentally if subjects’ decisions 
to reduce others’ income are modified by how they earned income. In their experiment, subjects 
play two games against the computer: the game of Luck and the game of Skill. The game of Luck 
consists, for each subject, to guess a number between 0 and 100. A subject wins if the number he 
guessed is close to the number randomly selected by the computer. The game of Skill is the classic 
Hare  and  Hounds  and  requires  some  logical  and  analytical  skills.
9 Both  games  are  played 
consecutively for 10 times.
 10 And after each game the subject has the possibility to subtract money 
                                                           
8 The effort task consisted during 10 periods in searching for a maximum value that varied over periods. 
9 In the game of Hare and Hounds, subjects play the role of hounds and the computer the role of hares. The 
hounds must catch the hare. The hare must escape. The hare is trapped if no move is feasible when its turn 
comes. Hounds and hares play sequentially. Subjects has three hounds and he has to choose one to move. 
Hounds can only move by one cell to the right, up or down. The hare can move by one cell in any direction. The 
hare  succeeds  in  escaping  when  it  passes  to  the  left  of  all  three  hounds  (more  information  on 
http://www.mazeworks.com/hounds/index.htm). 
10 To control for order effects, the authors reversed the orders of games. In one treatment subjects played first 
the game of Skill and then the game of Luck whereas in another treatment they played the games in the exact 




from  another  participant.
11 Subjects can choose to subtract money from any participant in the 
session. Thus all subjects can  be the target of others’ subtracting decisions. On average subjects 
choose to subtract 67.8% of the times.
12 The frequency of destruction is not significantly different 
between Luck and Skill games. In both games, subjects subtract most often those occupyi ng the top 
position (i.e. those having the highest endowments). The main result arises from that subjects, when 
subtracting income, are more sensitive to the difference between their own income and others’ 
income when the game is a game of Skill. However, as subjects face decisions from others’ players 
they might subtract income so as to retaliate against anticipated reduction decisions engaged by 
other subjects. 
Albeit  he  does  not  focus  on  effort,  Celse  (2009)  disentangles  the  impact  of  unflattering  social 
comparisons  on  individual  well-being  and  behaviour.  Subjects  are  paired  and  receive  randomly 
endowments.  Subjects  are  asked  to  report  their  satisfaction  before  and  after  being  exposed  to 
unflattering  social  comparisons.  Then  they  have  to  indicate  if  they  are  willing  to  reduce  the 
endowment of the player they are paired with. Celse (2009) observes that disadvantageous social 
comparisons affect subjects’ satisfaction: half of the subjects reports a decrease in their satisfaction 
after  exposure  to  social  comparison.  He  finds  that  social  comparisons  have  enough  impact  on 
individuals to exert a third of them to engage in reduction decisions. He conveys that although most 
reduction  decisions  (62.85%)  are  engaged  by  envious  subjects  envy  fails  at  predicting  subjects’ 
decisions to reduce income.
13 We chose to replicate this experimental design because it captures 
subjects’ reactions to unfavourable social comparisons both from an affective (by capturing subjects’ 
satisfaction)  and  a  behavioural  (by  examining  subjects’  decisions  to  reduce  others’  income) 
perspective.  
3. Experimental design  
 
Experimental sessions were conducted in spring 2009 for Luck condition and spring 2010 for Effort 
condition at the LEEM.
 14 Subjects were randomly recruited in a voluntary pool of subjects including 
                                                           
11 To subtract money, each subject has three alternatives. First they can choose to subtract an amount from 
one of other subjects and pay for this. They can choose to subtract 1$ with probability 0.25 from one other 
subject and pay nothing. And finally they can choose to do nothing. 
12 Close to this paper, we can also quote Zizzo and Oswald (2001). In which subjects can reduce others’ income 
after betting on a gamble. But this paper suffers from the same problem as Rustichini and Vostroknutov (2010). 
Zizzo (2003) rectifies the problem of strategic interaction and finds less destruction.  
13 In his experiment a subject is said to experience envy when his satisfaction decreases after exposure to 
unflattering social comparison. We chose the same definition of envy.  




more  than  4000  candidates  for  experiments.  Subjects  were  mainly  students  from  both  sexes, 
different ages (from 18 to 26 years old) and universities (scientific or not). We ruled 12 sessions of 
Luck condition and 10 sessions of Effort condition. On aggregate, 382 subjects participated in our 
experiment. 
We phrased both instructions and game as neutrally as possible (i.e. avoiding any suggestive terms 
such  as  opponent,  destruction...).
15 All instructions were computerised and displayed during the 
experiment. We chose to displ ay instructions during the experiment for two main reasons: First 
because we did not want subjects to know that they will evaluate their satisfaction and so to 
anticipate their future satisfaction. Second because the game was very easy to understand and th us 
could be made in very brief time (average time was 35 minutes for a session including payment). As 
instructions were displayed step by step, we did not check subjects’ understanding of the procedures. 
Nevertheless subjects were informed that they could  ask privately understanding questions to a 
monitor by raising their hands at every moment of the experiment. 
Participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of  the  two  possible  roles:  player  A  and  B.  Roles 
assignments were kept constant throughout each session. There was an identical number of players 
A and B in each session. After roles assignment each player A was randomly paired with a player B.  
To determine the impact of effort on subjects’ satisfaction and behaviour, we implemented two 
conditions: the Luck condition (Luck thereafter) and Effort condition (Effort afterwards). Subjects 
could only participate in one condition. In both conditions, all subjects knew, at the beginning of the 
experiment, that endowments ranged from 4€ to 32€ (in integer amounts). The difference between 
these two treatments relies on how endowments are attributed to subjects. In Luck, the computer 
randomly  drew  endowments  and  randomly  attributed  them  to  subjects  whereas  in  Effort  the 
endowment allocated to each player depended on each player’s effort.
 16 The effort task consisted in 
clicking  on  a  mouse  under  time  pressure  (1  minute):  the  more  they  clicked  the  higher  their 
endowment (see Appendix C).
 17 In Effort, subjects were, after clicking on their mouse, only informed 
of their own performance (i.e. number of clicks made). 
                                                           
15 Versions of the instructions are supplied in appendix A (for Luck) and B (for Effort). 
16 Players were informed that endowments are randomly attributed but they ignored that endowments also 
depended on roles. In both conditions, players A could receive an endowment of 4€ or 16€ and players B could 
receive an endowment of 8€, 20€ or 32€. In Luck, endowments were randomly allocated. In Effort, relying on 
pilot sessions we could set a certain number of clicks as thresholds. More precisely above 230 clicks players A 
obtained 16€ and below that threshold they obtained 4€. Concerning players B we established two thresholds 
(below the first threshold players B received 8€, between the first and the second threshold they received 20€ 
and above the second threshold they received 32€). Thresholds were kept constant in all sessions of Effort. 
17 We deliberately chose a one -minute time limit so as to allow comparisons between  Luck  and  Effort 




Subjects were also informed that only participants in the role of player A could make a decision and 
had to participate in the next steps. While players A were doing the experiment, players B were 
invited to remain silent and were only informed of their final payoff (they were not informed about 
the decision players A could make). 
The following instructions are the one presented to players A. Note that players A had to confirm 
each decision they took. 
The  experiment  was  single  shot  and  consisted  in  a  succession  of  six  steps  (only  players  A  are 
concerned with these steps). The experiment was identical in both sessions except that in Effort, 
previous to step 1, subjects had to perform a task that consisted in clicking on a mouse during 1 
minute so as to determine their endowments.  
Step 1: Each player A was informed about his monetary endowment expressed in Euros. The 
endowment varied according to the treatment (see Table 1). 
Step 2: Player A was invited to evaluate and to report his satisfaction level relative to his 
endowment.
 18 To do so, subjects were asked to move a slider on a graduated scale ranging 
from  -50  to  +50.  At  the  left  extreme  of  the  scale  (-50),  the  slider  indicated  the  state 
“Extremely  Dissatisfied”  and  at  the  other  extreme  (+50)  the  slider  indicated  the  state 
“Extremely Satisfied”. The middle position was valued by 0 and indicated “Neither satisfied 
nor  dissatisfied”  (see  appendix).  The  value  of  the  slider  was  indicated  in  a  table  (see 
Appendix D). 
Step 3: The endowment of player B was communicated to player A, revealing that their own 
endowment is lower. 
Step 4: Player A was asked again to evaluate his satisfaction, by using the same device as in 
Step 2.
 19  
                                                           
18 The use of self-report methods is acknowledged to be a reliable method. First, methods based on self-report 
measures are often used by emotion theorists and recurrent in happiness research and psychology. Second, 
the  satisfaction  evaluation  procedure  did  not  affect  subjects’  payoffs.  Thus  there  were  neither  financial 
incentives for subjects to report to be satisfied or dissatisfied nor incidence of their reported satisfaction (or 
dissatisfaction) on subjects’ payoffs. Third, recent studies have proved that results provided using self-report 
methods are supported, and thus reliable, by results supplied using physiological measures (Ben-Shakhar et al., 
2007). Finally, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that “subjects have no special reason to disguise their true 
preferences” (p. 265). 
19 There could be an order effect:  the second evaluation is conditional to the f irst one and therefore results 
may have been very different by asking first to the subject how satisfied he feels after being knowing others’ 
endowments and then how satisfied he feels after being informed of his own endowment. We chose this 




Step  5:  Each  player  A  was  informed  that  he  has  the  opportunity  to  reduce  player  B’s 
endowment (see Appendix E). If player A decided not to reduce player B’s endowment the 
experiment ended and each member of the pair received his endowment as a final payoff. If 
player A decided to reduce player B’s endowment, the game moved to Step 6. At this stage of 
the  game,  the  player  was  neither  informed  about  the  cost  of  reducing  the  opponent’s 
endowment  nor  the  amount  of  reduction.  We  chose  to  do  so  in  order  to  differentiate 
subjects who were willing to reduce others’ income from those who were not. 
Step 6: Player A had to indicate by how much he wanted to reduce player B’s endowment. 
Player A had to choose an integer amount between 1 to 10 units.
 As the subject had to 
confirm  his  decision,  he  clearly  announced  his  willingness  to  reduce  his  opponent’s 
endowment. As a consequence we did not allow null reductions. Each possible amount cut 
player B’s endowment by some fraction (depending on the treatment) and involved a cost for 
player A. Both the amount of reduction and the cost for reducing varied depending on the 
scenario subjects are placed in (see Table 1). We set the cost of reduction so as to allow 
comparisons in terms of actions undertaken by players A between subjects. To fulfil that 
purpose, the cost of reduction represented the same weight in player A’s initial endowment 
for each subject. Then in order to reduce his opponent’s endowment by 1 unit each player A 
had to sacrifice 2.5% of his initial endowment. Hence to equalise endowments, each player A 
had to give 25% of his initial endowment. If player A chose the maximum of 10 units, the final 
payoff of the two players were equalised. For a lower amount, player B’s payoff remained 
larger than player A’s payoff. We chose to do so as not to exert players A from investing the 
maximum allowed in order to have a superior payoff than players B. Player A could simulate 
the impact of his decision on the final payoffs of each member of the pair. 
 
At each step, a table summarised information from previous steps: subject’s performance (only for 
Effort) subject’s endowment, the value given at the first evaluation, the opponent’s endowment and 
the value given at the second evaluation.  
As  players  A  could  only  obtain  4€  or  16€  and  players  B  8€,  20€  and  32€  and  as  we  focus  on 
unfavourable situations (i.e. when player A has an inferior endowment), there are only 5 possible 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in a sort of dissatisfaction at the sight of others’ good fortunes and advantages. Then because we used a very 
similar procedure to the one used by Miles and Rossi (2007)  who test for an order effect. Miles and Rossi 
(2007) reverse the order of the questions and found that, whatever the order of the questions, results remain 




scenarios: A (4€; 8€), B (4€; 20€), C (4€; 32€), D (16€; 20€) and E (16€; 32€).
20 Thanks to these five 
allocations we can disentangle the impact of absolute inequalities (referring on the gap between 
players’ endowments measured in absolute terms) from the impact of relative ones (it refers to the 
gap between players’ endowments measured in relative terms). For illustration, in scenario A, the 
absolute difference equals 4€ whereas the relative difference equals 2. Passing from A to E involves 
two changes: absolute difference increases (equals 16€) and subjects’ endowments increase (player 
A’s receives now 16€ instead of 4€). Thus implementing other scenarios allow us to control for 
absolute and relative difference and to investigate the impact of both differences on individual well-
being and behaviour.
21 
Table 1: Parameters used in the experiment. 












A  4€  8€  4  2  -0.1×e  -0.5×e 
B  4€  20€  16  5  -0.1×e  -1.7×e 
C  4€  32€  28  8  -0.1×e  -2.9×e 
D  16€  20€  4  1.25  -0.4×e  -0.8×e 
E  16€  32€  16  2  -0.4×e  -2×e 
Note: e represents the amount invested by the subject in reduction decisions,           . The cost of reduction represents 
the cost players A had to give for each unit invested in reduction decisions (i.e. for each  ). The amount of reduction 
captures by how much player B’s endowment decreases for each unit invested in reduction decision. Then, in scenario C, a 
player A willing to invest 4 units in reducing player B’s endowment will have to incur a cost of 0.4€ (         and player B’s 
will incur a loss of 11.6€ (          ). 
4. Behavioural predictions 
 
In this section we present the research hypotheses and expected results from our experiment. We 
first develop conjectures about the connection between effort and social comparison (H1), then we 
present assumptions concerning the effect of effort on envy (H2) and concerning the correlation 
between effort and individual behaviour (H3). Finally we expand our research hypotheses related to 
the impact of inequalities on both individual well-being and behaviour (H4). From now, by using the 
term “subjects” we refer to players A and to players B by using the term “opponents”. 
H1: Effort and social comparisons. 
                                                           
20 We exclude of our analysis data from the scenario (16€ ; 8€).  
21 Then  absolute  difference  equals  to                                                and  relative 




H1a: Exposure to social comparison affects individual well-being.  
Social comparison is a deep rooted human behaviour and has a key role on self-evaluation. One can 
derive useful information from social comparisons. Social comparisons constitute useful devices so as 
to build inferences about one self (Festinger, 1954; Heider, 1958). They also contribute to ability 
assessment that can help in augmenting or damaging our self-esteem (Ben Ze'ev, 2000; Festinger, 
1954).  Social  comparisons  can  have  a  positive  impact  on  self-evaluation  when  they  lead  to  a 
flattering diagnostic (e.g. success or superiority) but they can alter dramatically one self-evaluation if 
they lead to an unflattering diagnostic (e.g. failure or inferiority). Besides, social comparisons can also 
serve  in  identifying  what  ingredients  are  required  for  obtaining  success  or  for  improving  one’s 
performance (Collins, 1996). Social comparisons have also a key role on satisfaction: satisfaction 
judgements result from the existing differences between one’s situation and the situation of one’s 
reference group that can be constituted by a single person, a group of persons, personal aspirations... 
(Michalos, 1985). Finally, previous results from happiness studies (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005) and from experimental investigations (Celse, 2009; Miles and Rossi, 
2007) convey that social comparisons affect significantly individual satisfaction. In Miles and Rossi 
(2007), after giving information about the wage offered to another classmate (whether superior or 
inferior to the subject’s wage), the great majority of subjects reported changes in their satisfaction. 
We assume that most subjects will report a different satisfaction level after being informed of their 
opponent’s endowment than the one reported after learning their own, whatever the condition 
subjects participate in. Hence, we expect that the proportion of subjects reporting changes in their 
satisfaction after being exposed to social comparison is higher than the proportion of subjects not 
reporting changes in their satisfaction.  
H1b:  The  introduction  of  effort  does  not  modulate  the  impact  of  social  comparison  on 
individual well-being.  
As  mentioned  previously,  social  comparisons  are  inherent  to  human  nature  and  fulfil  essential 
objectives. There are no reasons to anticipate that effort will strengthen or weaken the impact of 
social comparisons on subjects’ satisfaction. We thus make the following conjecture: the proportion 
of subjects reporting changes in their satisfaction is not different between Luck and Effort conditions. 
H2: Effort, envy and individual satisfaction. 
H2a: Unflattering social comparisons affect negatively individual well-being and generates 




Social comparisons leading to a diagnostic of inferiority or failure are experienced negatively and 
even painfully from subjects’ perspective. Unfavourable social comparisons are considered as painful 
experiences  because  they  reveal  one’s  relative  inferiority and,  as  a  consequence,  they  generate 
feelings of  ill-will  and  inferiority. These  feelings  have  very  negative  consequences  on  one’s self-
evaluation  and  self-esteem  (Collins,  1996;  Festinger,  1954;  Heider,  1958;  Smith  et  al., 1994).  As 
mentioned previously, we implement an experimental design so as to investigate the impact of effort 
on envy. Envy can be roughly pictured as a form of painful sadness caused by the awareness of 
others’ relative advantages (Ben Ze'ev, 1992, 2000; Celse, 2010; D’Arms, 2002; D’Arms and Kerr, 
2008;  Smith  and  Kim,  2007).  Hence  in  our  experiment,  a  subject  reporting  a  decrease  in  his 
satisfaction  after  being  informed  of  his  opponent’s  higher  endowment  may  indicate  to  be 
experiencing envy. Psychological researches convey that the experience of envy has very negative 
consequences on one self-esteem (Testa and Major, 1990; Smith and Parrott, 1988; Smith et al., 
1994). Besides, results from previous experiments strengthen the negative affective consequences of 
unflattering  social  comparisons.  Bault  et  al.  (2008)  reveal  that  subjects  report  to  experience 
situations in which their opponent received a superior payoff as the worst situation. Miles and Rossi 
(2007)  and  Celse  (2009)  convey  that  reported  subjective  well-being  shrinks  when  subjects  are 
exposed to disadvantageous social comparisons. As our experimental design is close to the latter, we 
might  look  forward to  observe  such  a similar  result.  We expect  that the  proportion  of  subjects 
reporting a decrease in their satisfaction after learning the opponent’s higher endowment is higher 
than the proportion of subjects reporting an increase or no change in satisfaction. 
H2b: Envy is amplified by effort: the negative impact of unfavourable social comparisons is 
strengthened through effort. 
Besides, relying on emotion theory, effort is acknowledged to amplify emotions (Ben Ze'ev, 2000; 
Ortony et al., 1988) and more precisely negative ones (van Dijk et al., 1999; Wyer and Srull, 1989). 
Hence, based on emotion theory, we predict that the proportion of subjects reporting a decrease in 
their satisfaction after learning the opponent’s endowment would be higher through effort.  In other 
words, we conjecture that there are significantly more subjects reporting negative changes in their 
satisfaction after being exposed to unflattering social comparison in Effort. 
H3: Effort, envy and individual behaviour.  
H3a:  Envy explains  reduction  decisions:  a  subject  is  more  likely to  reduce  his  opponent’s 




Although  standard  economic  theory  neglects  the  role  of  emotions,  they  are  known  to  have  a 
significant influence on individual behaviour (Camerer et al, 2005 ;Elster, 1998; Hume, 1991). Bosman 
and  van  Winden  (2002)  and  also  Bosman et  al.  (2005)  convey  that  emotions  constitute  a  good 
predictor of individual behaviour: subjects reporting to experience high levels of emotions are likely 
to destroy their endowment in a power-to-take game. Envy is acknowledged to be a powerful micro-
motivation leading to action (Ben Ze'ev, 2000; Smith and Kim, 2007). As a consequence, we expect 
that if envy explains why subjects report a decrease in their satisfaction after being exposed to social 
comparison, subjects, motivated by envy (i.e. reporting a decrease in their satisfaction after exposure 
to social comparison), might be more prone to undertake destructive decisions. 
H3b: Effort amplifies envy and thus subjects’ decisions to reduce others’ income.  
As mentioned previously, emotion theorists consider that effort modulates the intensity of emotions 
and that more effort generates more negative emotions (Ben Ze'ev, 2000; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et 
al., 1988; Wyer and Srull, 1989). 
22 As emotions are acknowledged to induce specific behaviour, more 
effort will intensify emotions and their impact on individual behaviour. Hence, relying on emotion 
theory, we assume that, as endowments depend on indivi dual effort, subjects might experience 
more intense emotions like envy and might be more prone to reduce their opponent’s endowment 
(H3b). To our knowledge, there are few experiments conveying this connection (van Dijk et al., 1999). 
We thus assume that there will be more reduction decisions in Effort rather than in Luck. 
H3c: Effort is associated to fairness and thus discourage subjects’ decisions to reduce others’ 
income.  
Nevertheless, we can make an opposite prediction if we refer to equity theory. According to Equity 
theory, more precisely to Theory of Desert (Buchanan, 1986), fairness is related to effort. Several 
quasi-experiments as well as laboratory experiments convey the existence of a connection between 
fairness and effort. With regard to their results, it sounds like individuals’ definition of fairness is 
deeply associated with the notion of effort (Burrows and Loomes, 1994; Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, 
2002;  Hoffman  and  Spitzer,  1985;  Lieventhal  and  Michaels,  1971;  Ruffle,  1998;  Schokkaert  and 
Capeau, 1991).
 23 More precisely, they observe that, from the subject’s perspective, a situation or an 
allocation is considered as fair when the distribution of income depends on the agent’s effort or 
performance  (even  if  situations  are  characterised  by  unequal  outcomes).  Hence  equity  theory 
                                                           
22 Wyer and Srull (1989) underline that the amplification role of effort is particularly true when efforts are 
invested in vain.  
23 Scholars  also  convey   that  fairness  is  related  to  efficiency  ( Andreoni  and  Miller,  2002 ;  Charness  and 
Grosskopf, 2001;  Charness and Rabin, 2002 ;  Kritikos and Bolle, 2001) but we restrict our analysis on the 




suggests  that  inequalities  generated  by  effort  are  socially  accepted.  As  a  consequence,  as 
endowments depend on individual effort, we might expect subjects to consider inequalities as fair 
and not to decide to reduce their opponent’s endowment (H3c). This does not implies that were be 
less  envy.  Subjects  can  still  suffer  from  envy  but  as  inequalities  depend  on  each  individual’s 
performance, they are more prone to accept these inequalities and less tempted to reduce others’ 
income. Then we guess that there will be more reduction decisions in Luck rather than in Effort. 
H4: Inequalities, individual satisfaction and behaviour. 
H4a: When exposed to unflattering social comparison, individual satisfaction is negatively 
correlated to the opponent’s endowment.  
Previous  results  both  from  happiness  studies  (Ferrer-i-Carbonell,  2005; Luttmer, 2005)  and  from 
experimental studies (Celse, 2009) convey that as the referent group’s income increases, individual 
well-being decreases. Relying on these results, we conjecture that as the opponent’s endowment 
increases,  reported  satisfaction  decreases.  We  set  the  distribution  of  endowments  so  as  to 
investigate the impact of inequalities measured both in absolute and in relative terms on individual 
satisfaction.  
H4b: When inequalities between subjects’ endowments increase, the probability for a subject 
to reduce his opponent’s endowment decreases.  
The  notion  of  “sense  of  alteration”  introduced  by  Ben  Ze'ev  (1992,  2000)  suggests  that  social 
emotions (i.e. emotions triggered by social comparison) are always more intense when differences 
between subjects are low. This notion captures the reality of every change perceived by the subject 
and  explains  that  slight  changes  have  more  emotional  impact  because  they  can  alter  even 
dramatically the subject’s position and self-esteem (e.g. the subject can pass from a superior position 
to an inferior one). Indeed as differences between subjects increase (resp. decrease), similarities 
between  them  become  less  (resp.  more)  obvious,  social  comparisons  are  less  (resp.  more)  self-
relevant and have less (resp. more) emotional impact. Referring on this notion, we assume that 
subjects  are  more  prone  to  undertake  destructive  decisions  in  presence  of  slight  differences 
(absolute or relative)(H4b). The polarization theory (Montalvo and Reynal-Quenol, 2005; Ostby, 2008) 
also supports this view. This theory postulates that conflicts between groups are more likely to 
emerge when opposing two similar groups. As similarities are less evident, the probability to engage 
in conflict decreases. The few experiments related to this issue  strengthen the hypothesis (Abbink et 






We analyse the results in two steps. First we present results relative to individual well-being (results 
1  to  3)  and  then  we  detail  those  dealing  with  individual  behaviour,  i.e.  decisions  to  reduce 
income(results 4 to 6). We first announce the result and then develop it.  
Result 1 : The majority of subjects reports changes in their satisfaction after exposure to social 
comparisons.  
Support:  As  Table  2  shows,  both  in  Luck  and  Effort  conditions  almost  80%  of  subjects  report  a 
different level of satisfaction after learning the opponent’s endowment from the satisfaction level 
reported after being informed of their own endowment.  
The first interesting result arises from that social comparisons exert a great impact on individual well-
being. On aggregate (i.e. cumulating data from both conditions) 79.89% of subjects indicate that 
others’ endowments affect their satisfaction. We observe that, whatever the condition subjects are 
placed in (Luck or Effort), the great majority of them report their satisfaction to be affected, whether 
positively or negatively, by learning their opponent’s higher endowment. 
Indeed when endowments are randomly attributed (Luck), 87 subjects out of 109 report changes, 
whether positive or negative, in their satisfaction after being exposed to an unfavourable social 
comparison. Although, in Effort, endowments are attributed according to each subject’s effort, we 
observe the same result as in Luck: 60 subjects out of 75 report their satisfaction to be affected by 
learning the opponent’s endowment. Both in Luck and Effort conditions, there are significantly more 
subjects  reporting  changes  in  their  satisfaction  than  subjects  not  reporting  changes  in  their 
satisfaction (p < 0.01, two-sample test of proportions). This result suggests that the way endowments 
are attributed seems to have no effect on subjects’ sensitivity to unflattering social comparisons. 
Hence  individual  well-being  depends  largely  on  others’  income.  This  result  supports  H1a  and 
corroborates quoted studies suggesting that social comparison is a deep rooted human attitude. 
Table  2:  Number  and  proportion  (in  parentheses)  of  subjects  reporting  changes,  or  not,  when  evaluating  their 
satisfaction. 
  Luck  Effort  Overall 






















We cumulate data from both conditions and we estimate a binary logit model in order to investigate 
whether the introduction of effort (or others variables) has an influence on the probability for a 
subject’s well-being to be affected by others’ situations (i.e. the probability for a subject to report 
changes  in  satisfaction  after  exposure  to  social  comparison).  The  variable 
                   catches  the  implementation  of  effort  and  equals  1  when  subjects  have  to 
make an effort so as to obtain their endowment. Results from logit estimations are given in Table 3. 
Only one variable has a significant effect: the relative difference between endowments which has a 
negative effect. As the gap between subjects’ endowments measured in relative terms increases, the 
probability  for  a  subject’s  satisfaction  to  be  affected  by  learning  the  opponent’s  endowment 
decreases. This result corroborates hypothesis H1b and is in line with the “sense of alteration” theory: 
as relative differences increase (resp. decrease), similarities between subjects are less (resp. more) 
obvious and social comparisons are less (resp. more) self-relevant and thus have less (resp. more) 
emotional impact. Results from logit estimations also indicate that the introduction of effort does not 
change subjects’ awareness to others’ situations and income. 
Table 3: Results from Logit estimations concerning the probability to report changes in satisfaction after exposure to 
social comparison  (Luck and Effort conditions). 
Logit Regression (Luck and Effort conditions) 
Nb.Obs                      184  
Adj-R Squared: 0.0273 
Dependent Variable:  Individual well-being is affected by social comparison (             ).  
Independent variables  Coefficients (std. errors) 
  (Subject’s endowment)  - 0.044 (0.057) 
                   (Introduction of effort)  0.406 (0.457) 
   (Relative difference)  - 0.731* (0.416) 
   (Absolute difference)  0.100 (0.066) 
        (Time for first evaluation)  0.0001 (0.011) 
        (Time for second evaluation)  - 0.006 (0.016) 
Constant  2.558 (1.077) 
Note: * indicates significant at  0.1 level;  ** significant at 0.05 level and ***  significant at 0.01 level.  The probability 
modelled is the subject’s well-being is affected by social comparison (             ). The dependent variable equals 1 
when the subject reports changes in his satisfaction after exposure to social comparison.    denotes the subject’s own 
endowment.    (resp.   ) represents the difference between the subject’s endowment and the opponent's endowment 
measured in absolute terms (resp. in relative terms). TpEval1 (resp. TpEval2) denotes the time subjects took for first (resp. 
second) evaluation. The variable                    catches the introduction of effort (it differentiates observations of 
                   from those of Luck).                    equals 0 if the subject participate in Luck. Using subjective 
data, the typical order of magnitude or the R-Squared is relatively low (ranging from 8% to 20%) and level of significance are 




Result  2 :  Exposed  to  disadvantageous  social  comparisons,  one  subject  out  of  two  reports  a 
decrease in his satisfaction.  
Support: As Table 4 shows, in both conditions the majority of players A reports their satisfaction to be 
negatively affected by learning their opponent’s higher endowment. 
On  aggregate  (i.e.  cumulating  data  from  both  conditions)  54.89%  of  subjects  report  an  inferior 
satisfaction level after being informed of their opponent’s endowment than the one reported after 
learning their own endowment (see Table 4). Hence individual well-being shrinks for the majority of 
subjects  after exposure  to  unflattering  social  comparison.  A  decrease  in satisfaction  means  that 
individual well-being is negatively affected by others’ situations. This might be explained by the 
experience of negative emotions such as envy.  On aggregate, the proportion of subjects reporting 
negative changes in their satisfaction is significantly higher than the proportion of subjects reporting 
positive  changes  or  no  changes  (resp.  p  <  0.01  and  p  <  0.01,  two-sample  test  of  proportions). 
Conversely,  on  aggregate,  we  do  not  find  any  significant  differences  when  we  compare  the 
proportion of players reporting positive changes and no changes in their satisfaction (p > 0.05, two-
sample test of proportions).  
Without  distinction  on  how  endowments  are  attributed,  the majority  of subjects  indicates  their 
satisfaction  to  be  negatively  affected  by  learning  others’  higher  endowments.  Indeed  in  both 
conditions, 1 subject out of 2 signals that exposure to unfavourable social comparison has a negative 
effect on individual well-being (55.05% in Luck and 54.67% in Effort). In both conditions, there are 
significantly more subjects signaling their satisfaction to be negatively affected by social comparison 
than subjects reporting positive or no changes in their satisfaction (resp. p < 0.01 and p < 0.01, two-
sample test of proportions). The proportion of subjects reporting a decrease in their satisfaction after 
knowing the opponent’s endowment is not significantly different between Luck and Effort (p > 0.05, 
two-sample  test  of  proportions).  Besides,  there  are  no  significant  differences  concerning  the 
proportion of subjects reporting positive changes or no changes in their satisfaction between the two 
conditions  (resp.  p  >  0.05  and  p  >  0.05,  two-sample  test  of  proportions).  Finally,  in  Luck,  the 
proportion of subjects that reports an increase in satisfaction is not significantly different from the 
proportion of subjects reporting no changes in satisfaction (p > 0.05, two-sample test of proportions). 
The same conclusion is drawn in Effort.   




Table 4: Number and frequency of changes (according to direction) and no changes in satisfaction. 
Direction of changes  Luck  Effort  Overall 
Negative changes in satisfaction  60 (55.05%)  41 (54.67%)  101 (54.89%) 
No changes in satisfaction  22 (20.18%)  15 (20.00%)  37 (20.11%) 
Positive changes in satisfaction  27 (24.77%)  19 (25.33%)  46 (25.00%) 
Total  109 (100.0%)  75 (100.0%)  184 (100.0%) 
 
Again we estimate a binary logit model in order to investigate if the introduction of effort or other 
variables have an impact on the probability for a subject to report a decrease in his satisfaction (i.e. 
to  experience  envy)  after  being  informed  of  his  opponent’s  endowment.  Results  from  logit 
estimations are given in Table 5 and convey that the subject’s own endowment has a significant and 
positive impact. A subject is more prone to report a decrease in his satisfaction after exposure to 
social comparison when the  subject’s endowment increases. The result seems at first sight surprising 
but the negative correlation between individual income and the probability for a subject to report 
positive  changes  in  his  satisfaction  corresponds  to  the  idea  that  subjects,  as  individual  wealth 
increases, allow more importance on others’ situations and income rather than on their own income 
(Celse, 2009; Layard, 2005).
 24 As in result 1, the introduction of effort has no significant effect on 
individual well-being: it does not affect the probability for  a subject to report a decrease in his 
satisfaction after exposure to unfavourable social comparison. 
Table 5: Results from logit estimates concerning the probability for an individual to report a decrease in his satisfaction 
after exposure to social comparison (Luck and Effort conditions). 
Logit Regression (Luck and Effort conditions) 
Nb.Obs                      184  
Adj-R Squared: 0.0954 
Dependent Variable:  Individual well-being is negatively affected by social comparison (             ).  
Independent variables  Coefficients (std. errors) 
   (Subject’s endowment)  0.104** (0.049) 
                   (Introduction of effort)  0.078 (0.941) 
   (Relative difference)  - 0.139 (0.359) 
   (Absolute difference)  0.037 (0.053) 
        (Time for first evaluation)  - 0.009 (0.009) 
        (Time for second evaluation)  0.005 (0.014) 
Constant  -0.850 (0.941) 
                                                           




Note: * indicates significant at  0.1 level;  ** significant at 0.05 level and ***  significant at 0.01 level.  The probability 
modelled is the subject’s well-being is negatively affected by social comparison (             ). The dependent variable 
equals 1 when the subject report a decrease in his satisfaction after learning his opponent’s endowment. The variable 
                   catches  the  introduction  of  effort  (it  differentiates  observations  of  Effort  from  those  of  Luck). 
                   equals 0  if the subject participate in Luck. 
Hence exposure to disadvantageous social comparison affects negatively individual well-being. The 
satisfaction subjects derive from unflattering social comparisons is not affected by how endowments 
are attributed (as observed in previous result). Besides the introduction of effort does not affect the 
probability for a subject to experience envy. Hypothesis H2a is validated while hypothesis H2b is not. 
Result 3 : In both conditions, individual satisfaction is significantly and negatively correlated both 
to the subject’s and to the opponent’s endowments.  
Support: Tables 6 and 7 report the results from PLS regressions made on the satisfaction subjects 
derive from social comparisons. 
We investigate the determinants of individual well-being in both conditions. To fulfil that objective 
we order Partial Least Square (PLS) regressions for each condition separately.
 25 We build a variable, 
entitled          which  captures  the  impact  of  social  comparisons  on  individual  satisfaction. 
         is made by subtracting the two reported levels of satisfaction. 26 In other words          
catches the direction (positive or negative) and the intensity of the satisfaction subjects draw from 
social comparisons.          is positive (resp. negative) when the level of satisfaction reported at 
the  second  evaluation  is  higher  (resp.  lower)  than  the  one  reported  at  the  first  evaluation.  If 
         is  positive  (resp.  negative),  it  indicates  that  the  subject  reports  an  increase  (resp.  a 
decrease) in his satisfaction after learning the opponent’s endowment: the subject reports to be 
more (resp. less) satisfied, or less (resp. more) dissatisfied, after being informed of his opponent’s 
endowment.  
When endowments are given like manna from heaven (Luck), we observe from Table 6 that three 
variables are significantly and negatively correlated to the satisfaction subjects derive from social 
comparisons: the subject and the opponent’s endowments and the absolute difference between 
endowments.  Hence  when  one  of  these  three  variables  increases,          decreases.  Subjects 
derive lower satisfaction from social comparisons if any of these variables increases. If the negative 
relationship between          and the opponent’s endowment (and also the negative relationship 
                                                           
25 PLS regression is a method based on the construction of orthogonal factors in order to improve the quality of 
the model (Tenenhaus, 1998). It suits perfectly for constructing predictive models when the factors are highly 
collinear and enables regressions without excluding linear variables. Indeed when factors are collinear, Multiple 
Linear  Regression  is  inappropriate.  Many  variables  from  our  experiment  suffer  from  collinearity.  Through 
ordering PLS regressions, we can observe the importance of each variable on predicting the response. 




between          and absolute difference) was expected by referring to results from happiness 
studies (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005), the negative correlation 
between          and  individual  income  seems  more  surprising.
 27 This  suggests  that  above  a 
certain level of income, subjects put a larger weight on others’ situations and allow more importance 
to others’ income and to existing differences rather than to their own income.
 28  
Table 6: Results from PLS regression (variable of importance, weight and direction of the relation) on the satisfaction 
subjects derive from social comparisons (Luck). 
PLS regression (Luck) 
Nb. Obs : 109  
Adj-R Squared: 0.1074 














   (Player A’s endowment)  - 0.538  - 0.547  1.319*  - 0.473 
   (Player B’s endowment)  - 0.622  - 0.625  1.523*  - 0.313 
   (Relative difference)  - 0.007  0.006  0.017  - 0.107 
   (Absolute difference)  - 0.555  - 0.551  1.359*  - 0.496 
         0.114  0.069  0.280  0.026 
         0.040  0.041  0.099  0.014 
Constant        6.993 
Note: Vectors Wh* (weighting vectors) consist of the weight given to each spectral variable in the computation of the latent 
variable. Vectors Wh* point out the importance of each explanatory variable in explaining each factor (latent variable). 
Vectors Ph reflect the correlation between latent variables and explanatory variables: they indicate the direction of the 
connection. The VIP (Variable Importance for Projection) indicates the importance of each explanatory variable both to 
explain latent variables and to correlate dependent variable. Important (resp. unimportant) explanatory variables possess 
VIP values larger (resp. lower) than 1 (resp. 0.5).    denotes player B’s endowment.  
When endowments are attributed in proportion to each subject’s effort (Effort), PLS regressions 
convey  that  individual  effort  (i.e.  number  of  clicks  made  by  the  subject),  the  subject’s  and  the 
opponent’s endowments are significantly and negatively correlated to          (see Table 7). As in 
Luck, results show that the opponent’s endowments has a key role on individual well-being. As the 
opponent’s endowment increases, subjects’ satisfaction derived from social comparisons decreases. 
Thanks to the PLS regression method, we can investigate the relative importance of individual effort 
and of individual income on predicting         . Both are significantly and negatively correlated to 
                                                           
27 The same result is observed in Celse (2009). 
28 This result supports comments from Hirsch (1976). The latter suggest that as individual wealth increases (and 
as basic needs are satisfied), the portion of wealth devoted to positional goods (i.e. goods assigning status and 




        . Whereas individual income has a larger VIP value than individual effort, unstandardised 
coefficient of regressions convey that both variables have almost a similar effect on predicting the 
response (-0.209 vs. -0.174).  
Table 7: Results from PLS regression (variable of importance, weight and direction of the relation) on the satisfaction 
subjects derive from social comparisons (Effort). 
PLS regression (Effort) 
Nb. Obs : 75  
Adj-R Squared: 0.3453 














   (Player A’s endowment)  -0.552  -0.567  1.453*  -0.209 
   (Player B’s endowment)  -0.572  -0.480  1.504*  -0.217 
   (Relative difference)  0.240  0.331  0.632  0.091 
   (Absolute difference)  -0.114  0.010  0.300  -0.043 
         -0.136  -0.133  0.358  -0.051 
         -0.280  -0.149  0.737  -0.106 
Clicks  -0.460  -0.528  1.209*  -0.174 
Constant        -0.270 
Note: The variable “Clicks” catches the number of clicks made by the subject and represents individual effort. 
Hence, both in Luck and Effort conditions, the opponent’s endowment has a key role in evaluating 
individual well-being. In line with results from happiness studies, we observe a negative correlation 
between the amount of the opponent’s endowment and individual satisfaction. Results corroborate 
hypothesis H4a. Whereas in Luck the absolute difference modulates individual well-being, we do not 
observe such a result in Effort. Why individual well-being on Luck is significantly correlated to the 
absolute  difference  between  subjects’  endowments  (  )  and  not  in  Effort?  Maybe  the  focus  of 
individual well-being is different between the two conditions. In Effort, the subject is focused on his 
own performance (that determines his endowment) whereas in Luck the subject has no control on 
his endowment, then the subject focuses more on others’ endowments. 
Result 4 : The proportion of reduction decisions is not significantly different between Luck and 
Effort  conditions.  Nevertheless  subjects  cut  a  significantly  higher  fraction  of  their  opponent’s 




Support: As Table 8 shows, on aggregate, 34.78% of subjects choose to reduce their opponent’s 
endowment. Whereas a non-significantly different number of reduction decisions is undertaken in 
both conditions, the amount invested in reduction decisions is significantly higher when endowments 
are attributed through effort. From now, we will refer to the term “intensity” to represent the amount 
subjects invest in reduction decisions. 
On aggregate, one subject out of three indicates to be willing to reduce the opponent’s endowment 
(see  Table  8).  Although  there  are  few  subjects  choosing  to  reduce  others’  income,  this  result 
strengthens  the  key  role  of  social  comparisons  on  individual  behaviour.  The  exposure  to  social 
comparison and the possibility to subtract money from others seem to be sufficient conditions to 
exert a third of subjects to reduce others’ income. 
Table 8: Number (and proportion) and average intensity of reductions decisions. 
Treatment  Luck  Effort  Overall 
Number of Reduction decisions 
(proportions) 
35 (32.11%)  29 (38.67%)    64 (34.78%) 
Average intensity  3.34  6.41  4.73 
Note: Average intensity refers to the average amount subjects invest in reduction decisions,            . 
When endowments are randomly attributed, 35 subjects out of 109 (i.e. 32.11%) choose to reduce 
their opponent’s endowment. When endowments are attributed according to each subject’s effort, 
29  subjects  out  of  75  (i.e.  38.67%)  indicate  that  they  are  willing  to  reduce  their  opponent’s 
endowment. Although there are proportionally more reduction decisions in Effort than in Luck, this 
difference is not significant (p > 0.05, two-sample test of proportions). Hence, the introduction of 
effort  does  not  seem  to  exert  more  subjects  to  reduce  others’  income.  To  corroborate  this 
observation, we gather data from both conditions and estimate a binary logit model in order to test 
whether the introduction of effort has a significant impact on the probability for a subject to engage 
in a reduction decision. The dependent variable        equals 1 if a subject chooses to reduce his 
opponent’s endowment. The independent variable is                   . The binary logit model 
shows  that  the  probability  associated  to  the  variable                      (catching  the 
introduction  of  effort)  is not  significant  (p  = 0.529).  Although  when  endowments  are  attributed 
according to individual effort subjects choose more often to reduce their opponent’s endowment, 
the introduction of effort plays no role in subjects’ decisions to subtract income.  
From Table 8 we observe that the intensity of reduction decisions is higher when endowments are 
attributed  according  to  individual  effort.  Reduction  decisions  in  Luck  are  not  intense:  although 




units.  Conversely  in  Effort,  subjects  invest  more  in  reducing  their  opponent’s  endowment:  they 
choose to  invest, on average, 6.41 units. If we take a look at the intensity of reduction decisions, 
results  from  a  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  convey  that  the  distribution  of  intensity  of  actions  are 
different between Luck and Effort (p = 0.003, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution). 
More precisely, subjects cut a significantly higher fraction of their opponent’s endowment when 
endowments are attributed through effort (p = 0.0008, two sided Mann-Whitney). Hence, reduction 
decisions are significantly more intense in Effort. Although the introduction of effort does not exert 
more subjects to reduce their opponent’s income, it pushes subjects to cut a higher portion of their 
opponent’s endowment.  
We order Partial Least Square regressions (PLS) in order to identify the variables that are correlated 
to the intensity of reduction decisions in both conditions.
29 Results from PLS regressions are given in 
Table 9 for Luck and Table 10 for Effort. When endowments are randomly attributed, we observe 
that  the  intensity  of  destructive  decisions  is  significantly  and  negatively  correlated  to  the  gap 
between subjects’ endowments measured both in absolute and relative terms. Hence as the distance 
between subjects’ endowments decreases subjects invest more when reducing income. This result 
corroborates  the  “sense  of  alteration”  theory:  as  similarities  between  subjects  are  less  evident 
(inequalities increase), emotions are experienced less intensively, have less incidence on individual 
behaviour and thus turn subjects to cut a fewer fraction of income. PLS regressions also underline 
that the intensity of negative actions is negatively correlated to            . This variable catches 
the  intensity  of  changes  in  satisfaction.
 30 Hence,  in  Luck,  subjects  reporting  slight  changes  in 
satisfaction cut a higher fraction of the opponent’s endowment.  
   
                                                           
29 Again, as variables are highly collinear we cannot implement Multiple Linear Regressions.  




Table 9: Results from PLS regression on the intensity of reduction decisions (Luck). 
PLS regression (Luck) 
Nb. Obs : 35 
Adj-R Squared: 0.1698 














   (Player A’s endowment)  0.240  0.123  0.679  0.041 
   (Player B’s endowment)  -0.160  -0.275  0.453  -0.016 
   (Relative difference)  -0.696  -0.662  1.969*  -1.751 
   (Absolute difference)  -0.500  -0.579  1.416*  -0.083 
                             0.190  1.133  0.537  0.005 
                                 -0.377  -0.379  1.086*  -0.014 
          -0.045  -0.122  0.128  -0.002 
         -0.003  -0.123  0.009  -0.000 
Constant        7.239 
 
In  Effort,  the  intensity  of  negative  actions  is  significantly  and  negatively  correlated  to  the  time 
subjects  take  for  their  first  satisfaction  evaluation  and  to  the  subject’s  own  endowment.  The 
intensity of negative actions is also significantly and positively correlated to the satisfaction subjects 
derive from social comparisons (captured by the variable         ) and to the relative difference 
(i.e. difference captured by the ratio between subjects’ endowments). 




Table 10: Results from PLS regression on the intensity of reduction decisions (Effort). 
PLS regression (Effort) 
Nb. Obs : 29  
Adj-R Squared: 0.3211 














   (Player A’s endowment)  -0.409  -0.478  1.163*  -0.134 
   (Player B’s endowment)  -0.100  -0.144  0.286  -0.033 
   (Relative difference)  0.391  0.430  1.114*  0.087 
   (Absolute difference)  0.267  0.278  0.759  0.128 
         -0.553  -0.095  1.573*  -0.181 
         -0.275  -0.365  0.783  -0.090 
                             0.537  0.341  1.527*  0.176 
                                 -0.087  -0.095  0.249  -0.028 
        -0.179  -0.350  0.510  -0.058 
Constant        1.816 
Note: The variable        catches the number of clicks made by the subject (i.e. subject’s performance).  
In Effort, the negative correlation between the intensity of reduction decisions and the time taken 
during the first satisfaction evaluation procedure can be considered as an additional evidence for the 
experience of negative emotions (e.g. envy). Negative emotions (such as anger, disappointment, 
frustration or envy), despite of arising quickly, are acknowledged to be experienced very intensively 
and for having a strong influence on individual behaviour (Ben Ze'ev, 2000; Bosman and van Winden, 
2002; Bosman et al., 2005; van Dijk et al., 1999; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; Wyer and Srull, 
1989). Hence a subject that takes little time for evaluating his satisfaction is ought to experience 
negative emotions. This could explain why subjects taking little time for evaluating their satisfaction 
invest more when subtracting income from their opponent’s endowment: they are consumed by 
negative emotions like envy or disappointment (see subsequently).  
A striking result arises from the positive correlation between the intensity of reduction decisions and 
the  satisfaction subjects  derive  from  unflattering  social  comparison.  It  indicates  that  as  subjects 
derive satisfaction from social comparison they cut a higher fraction of their opponent’s endowment 
when reducing income (see Table 11). Indeed, in Effort, the intensity of reduction decisions engaged 
by  subjects  reporting  a  decrease  in  their  satisfaction  is  significantly  lower  than  the  intensity  of 




Mann-Whitney). There  are  no other  significant  differences  concerning the  intensity of  reduction 
decisions in Effort. This corroborates results from PLS regressions.
 31  
Table 11: Average intensity of reduction decision according to direction of changes in satisfaction. 
  Luck  Effort 
Subjects reporting negative changes in satisfaction   3.05  5.17 
Subjects not reporting changes in satisfaction   3.83  7.17 
Subjects reporting positive changes in satisfaction   3.86  7.36 
 
To  summarise, we observe that effort affects partially individual behaviour. Effort does not exerts 
more subjects to destroy others’ income but it induces subjects to destroy a higher portion of others’ 
income. Indeed when endowments are attributed according to individual effort, subjects do not take 
more destructive actions but they take more intense ones, i.e. they destroy a higher part of their 
opponent’s endowment. These results do not support hypothesis H3c  and partially validate H3b. We 
also find some evidences in Luck for hypothesis H4b (see discussion section for Effort). 
Result 5 : The majority of reduction decisions is engaged by subjects that report their satisfaction 
to be affected by others’ situation. Although in Luck reduction decisions are mostly undertaken by 
subjects reporting a decrease in their satisfaction, we do not observe such a result in Effort. 
Support:  Table  12  presents  the  number  of  subjects  reducing  income  according  to  changes  in 
satisfaction whereas Table 13 precises the direction of changes. As Table 13 and 14 show, in both 
conditions  almost  8  subjects  out  of  10  that  reduce  their  opponent’s  endowment  report  their 
satisfaction  to  be  affected  when  learning  their  opponent’s  endowment.  In  Luck,  22  reduction 
decisions out of 35 are undertaken by subjects whose satisfaction is negatively affected by social 
comparison. Conversely, in Effort, 12 destructive actions out of 29 are the result from decisions of 
subjects reporting a decrease in their satisfaction. 
On aggregate, the huge majority of reduction decisions (81.25%) is engaged by subjects reporting 
changes in their satisfaction after being exposed to social comparison (see Table 12). We observe the 
same result whether endowments are attributed randomly (i.e. 82.86%) or according to individual 
effort  (i.e.  79.31%).  In  both  conditions,  subjects  that  indicate  their  satisfaction  to  be  affected 
(whether  positively  or  negatively)  by  learning  their  opponent’s  higher  endowment  choose 
significantly more often to reduce the latter’s endowment than subjects whose satisfaction is not 
                                                           
31 Conversely, in Luck subjects reporting their satisfaction to be negatively affected by social comparison do not 




affected by social comparisons (p < 0.01, two-sample test of proportions). The proportion of subjects 
reporting changes (resp. not reporting changes) in satisfaction and choosing to reduce income is not 
significantly different between Luck and Effort conditions (resp. p > 0.05 and p > 0.05, two-sample 
test of proportions). This result strengthens the key role of social comparison and their impact on 
individual behaviour. 
Table  12:  Number  and  proportion  (in  parentheses)  of  subjects  choosing  to  reduce  their  opponent's  endowment 
according to satisfaction. 
  Luck  Effort  Overall 
Subjects reporting changes in their 
satisfaction 
29 (82.86%)  23 (79.31%)  52 (81.25%) 
Subjects not reporting changes in their 
satisfaction 
6 (17.14%)  6 (20.69%)  12 (18.75%) 
Total number of reduction decisions  35 (100.0%)  29 (100.0%)  64 (100.0%) 
 
Who  chooses  to  reduce  the  opponent’s  endowment?  Table  13  details the  number of  reduction 
decision  according  to  the  direction  of  changes  in  satisfaction.  On  aggregate,  the  proportion  of 
destructive  decisions  engaged  by  subjects  reporting  negative  changes  in  their  satisfaction  is 
significantly higher than the proportion of actions undertaken by subjects reporting positive or no 
changes  in  their  satisfaction  (resp.  p  <  0.01  and  p  <  0.01,  two-sample  test  of  proportions).  No 
significant  differences  are  detected  between  the  number of  destructive  decisions  resulting  from 
subjects reporting an increase in their satisfaction and the number of negative actions engaged by 
subjects not affected by social comparisons (p > 0.05, two-sample test of proportions).  
We now consider reduction decisions undertaken in Luck. We observe that subjects reporting their 
satisfaction to be negatively affected by others’ situations engage in significantly more destructive 
decisions than those reporting positive changes or no changes in their satisfaction (resp. p < 0.01 and 
p < 0.01, two-sample test of proportions). Indeed, when endowments are given like manna from 
heaven, the majority of destructive decisions (62.86%) results from decisions of subjects reporting a 
decrease in their satisfaction after learning the opponent’s endowment (see Table 13).  
Considering behaviour in Effort, conclusions are less obvious. When endowments are given according 
to individual effort, the majority of destructive decisions  is engaged by subjects reporting, after 
exposure to social comparison, negative changes or positive changes in their satisfaction. There are 
no significant differences if we compare the number of reduction decisions undertaken by subjects 
reporting a decrease in their satisfaction with the number of reduction decisions engaged by subjects 




detect  any  significant  differences  when  comparing  the  number  of  negative  actions  undertaken 
whatever the direction of changes in satisfaction.  
In other words, subjects that report their satisfaction to be negatively affected by social comparison 
are ought to experience negative emotions as envy. When endowments depend on luck, envy is 
responsible  for  the  majority  of  destructive  actions  (22  actions  out  of  35,  i.e.  62.86%).  When 
endowments depend on effort, envy is responsible for less than half the actions engaged (12 actions 
out of 29, i.e. 41.38%). Besides, the most surprising result arises from that, in Effort, 11 actions out of 
29 (i.e. 37.93%) are undertaken by subjects indicating their satisfaction to be positively affected by 
unflattering social comparisons. In other words, in Effort, there are 4 actions out of 10 resulting from 
choices of subjects who derive satisfaction from unflattering social comparisons. This puzzling result 
suggests the existence of additional motives behind subjects’ motivations and decisions in Effort (see 
the discussion section).  
Table 13: Number and proportion (in parentheses) of reduction decisions undertaken according to direction of changes in 
satisfaction. 
  Luck  Effort  Overall 
Subjects reporting negative changes in 
their satisfaction 
22 (62.86%)  12 (41.38%)  34 (53.13%) 
Subjects not reporting changes in their 
satisfaction 
6 (17.14%)  6 (20.69%) 
 
12 (18.75%) 
Subjects reporting positive changes in 
their satisfaction 
7 (20.00%)  11 (37.93%)  18 (28.13%) 
Total number of reduction decisions  35  29  64 
 
Although in Luck, reduction decisions are mostly undertaken by subjects reporting negative changes 
in satisfaction, we observe that satisfaction fails at predicting individuals’ behaviour (see Table 14). 
Indeed  60  subjects  out  of  109  report  negative  changes  in  their  satisfaction  after  learning  their 
opponent’s endowment. Among these 60 subjects 22 choose to reduce their opponent’s endowment 
(i.e. 36.66%).  Besides 27 subjects out of 109 indicate positive changes in their satisfaction after being 
exposed  to  social  comparison.  Among  these  27  subjects,  7  decide  to  reduce  their  opponent’s 
endowment (i.e. 25.92%). If we compare the proportion of subjects reporting negative changes in 
satisfaction  and  choosing  to  reduce  income    with  the  proportion  of  subjects  reporting  positive 
changes in satisfaction and choosing to reduce income, we do not find any significant differences (p > 
0.1 ,two-sample test of proportions).
32  
                                                           
32 Same conclusions are drawn when comparing the proportion of subjects reporting negative changes (resp. 
positive) in satisfaction and choosing to reduce income with the proportion of subjects not reporting changes in 




In  Effort,  41  subjects  out  of  75  report  a  decrease  in  satisfaction  after  being  informed  of  their 
opponent’s  endowment.  Among  these  41  subjects,  12  choose  to  reduce  income  (i.e.  29.26%). 
Besides, 19 subjects out of 75 indicate an increase in satisfaction. Among these 19 subjects, 11 
decide  to  reduce  their  opponent’s  endowment  (i.e.  57.89%).  If  we  compare  the  proportion  of 
subjects whose satisfaction decreases after social comparison and that choose to reduce income with 
the proportion of subjects whose satisfaction increases after social comparison and that choose to 
reduce income, we do observe a significant difference (p < 0.05, two-sample test of proportions). 
Nevertheless there  are  no  significant  differences  between  the  proportion of  indifferent  subjects 
choosing  to  reduce  income  and  the  proportion  of  subjects  whose  satisfaction  increases  (resp. 
decreases) and choosing to reduce income ( p > 0.05 for both comparisons, two-sample test of 
proportions). 
Hence  resorting  to  satisfaction  reports  has  some  limit  when  predicting  individuals’  decisions  to 
reduce income. Besides, in Effort, we observe that subjects reporting positive changes in satisfaction 
reduce significantly more income than subjects reporting negative changes.  
Table 14: Proportion of subjects reducing income and according to direction of changes in satisfaction. 
 
Direction of changes in 
satisfaction 
Luck  Effort 
Nb. of 






           
Nb. of 






           
Negative changes  60  22  36.66%  41  12  29.26% 
No changes   22  6  22.22%  15  6  40.0% 
Positive changes  27  7  25.92%  19  11  57.89% 
 
 
Result 6 : When endowments are randomly attributed, the probability of reducing the opponent’s 
endowment depends negatively on the relative difference (i.e. difference captured by the ratio 
between  subjects’  endowments)  whereas  when  endowments  are  attributed  according  to 
individual effort, the probability of reducing depends negatively on individual effort. 
Support: Table 15 (for Luck) and 16 (for Effort) report the results from logit estimations concerning 




In  result  4,  we  observe  that  the  introduction  of  effort  does  not  play  a  significant  role  on  the 
probability to reduce the opponent's endowment. Thus we estimate binary logit models, for each 
condition separately, in order to identify the determinants of individual behaviour (i.e. subjects’ 
decisions  to  reduce  others’  income).  We  observe  that  the  parameters  modulating  individual 
behaviour  are  different  whether  endowments  are  attributed  like  manna  from  heaven  (Luck)  or 
according to individual effort (Effort).  
In Luck, the probability to reduce others’ income is significantly and negatively correlated to the 
relative difference between subjects’ endowments (see Table 15).
33 In other words, as the relative 
difference increases the probability for a subject to engage  in a reduction action decreases. When 
endowments  are  randomly  attributed,  we  find  evidences  supporting  the  “sense  of  alteration” 
suggesting that social emotions have less emotional impact and thus are less prone to exert subjects 
to take action in presence of high differences.  
   
                                                           
33 Senik (2005) argue that the order of magnitude of the R-Squared and level of significance are low when using 
subjective data. This explains why we choose to increase our level of significance from 0.05 to 0.1 when trying 




Table 15: Results on Logit regression concerning the probability to reduce the opponent’s endowment (Luck). 
Logit Regression (Luck) 
Nb. Obs : 109  
Adj-R Squared: 0.0446 
Dependent Variable:  Subject reduces the opponent’s endowment (          ) 
Independent variables  Coefficients (std. errors) 
                            0.001 (0.012) 
                                 0.013 (0.010) 
   (Relative difference)  -1.338* (0.718) 
   (Absolute difference)  0.015 (0.045) 
        (Time for first evaluation)  -0.004 (0.012) 
        (Time for second evaluation)  -0.015 (0.012) 
Constant  1.746 (1.203) 
Note: * indicates  significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level and ***  significant at 0.01 level.  The 
probability  modelled  is  subject  chooses  to  reduce  the  opponent’s  endowment.  The  dependent  variable  is 
      , it equals 1 when the subject chooses to reduce the opponent’s endowment.  
When endowments are attributed according to individual effort, we observe that subjects making 
low efforts levels are more prone to reduce others’ endowments. Indeed the probability to destroy 
the opponent’s endowment is significantly and negatively correlated to individuals’ effort (see Table 
16). This result underlines the key role of effort on individual behaviour. Figure 1 represents the 
proportion of reduction decisions engaged according to individual effort. In spite of the results from 
logit estimations, we can observe from Figure 1 that as effort increases, less subjects choose to 
reduce  others’  endowments.  Indeed  the  highest  proportions  of  reduction  decisions  are  reached 
when efforts are low (i.e. inferior to 200 clicks). If we take a look at the behaviour of subjects 
performing poorly (i.e. reaching less than 100 clicks in a minute), we observe that almost 2 subjects 
out of three engage in a destructive decision. The proportion shrinks dramatically if we consider 
better performing subjects (i.e. reaching more than 400 clicks in a minute). Indeed, concerning high 
performing subjects, only 1 subject out of 10 subjects chooses to reduce his opponent’s endowment.  




Table 16:  Results on Logit regression concerning the probability to reduce the opponent’s endowment (Effort). 
Logit Regression (Effort) 
Nb. Obs : 75  
Adj-R Squared: 0.1477 
Dependent Variable:  Subject reduces the opponent’s endowment (          ) 
Independent variables  Coefficients (std. errors) 
                            0.003 (0.012) 
                                 0.021 (0.015) 
   (Relative difference)  0.349 (0.431) 
   (Absolute difference)  -0.094 (0.100) 
        (Time for first evaluation)  0.003 (0.024) 
        (Time for second evaluation)  -0.004 (0.002) 
        -0.004* (0.002) 
Constant  1.746 (1.203) 
Note: * indicates  significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level and ***  significant at 0.01 level.  The 
probability  modelled  is  subject  chooses  to  reduce  the  opponent’s  endowment.  The  dependent  variable  is 
       and it equals 1 when a subject chooses to reduce his opponent’s endowment.  
Figure 1: Proportion of reduction decisions according to individual effort (Effort). 
 
To  summarise,  determinants  of  individual  behaviour  are  different  whether  endowments  are 
attributed randomly or according to individual performance. Besides individual performance predicts 
whether a subject choose to reduce or not. Poor performing subjects are more prone to destroy 
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In  condition  Effort,  subjects  reporting  an  increase  in  their  satisfaction  after  being  exposed  to 
unflattering social comparison engage in as many destructive actions as subjects reporting a decrease 
in  their  satisfaction.  Besides  subjects  whose  satisfaction  increases  after  exposure  to  social 
comparison cut a higher fraction of their opponent’s endowment than subjects whose satisfaction 
decreases after exposure to social comparison (see result 4). A subject whose satisfaction decreases 
after social comparison is said to experience negative social emotions (e.g. envy). On the contrary, a 
subject  whose  satisfaction  increases  after  exposure  to  social  comparison  is  said  to  experience 
positive social emotions (e.g. altruism, generosity…). Then one would not expect such a subject to 
undertake as many reduction decisions and to cut a higher fraction as subjects experiencing negative 
emotions. This puzzling result suggests the existence of additional motives (other than altruism or 
generosity) behind subjects’ motivations and decisions in Effort. A plausible explanation would be 
disappointment and frustration. Although subjects indicate that they are happy for others’ higher 
situation, they might be disappointed of their performance or frustrated of having failed to achieve a 
higher income. In that later case, social comparison damages more the subject self-evaluation: the 
subject receives less and he performs poorly (or he fails at achieving a better income). In line with 
envy, disappointment and frustration are very invasive emotions. Disappointment is experienced 
after failure on a task and is closely related to decision making (Gill and Prowse, 2009; Loomes and 
Sugden, 1982, 1986; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg et al., 2000). Frustration is acknowledged to be a 
very powerful emotion leading to aggressive and violent behaviour (Berkowitz, 1989, 1990; Dill and 
Anderson, 1995; Kulik and Brown, 1979; Rule et al., 1978).
 34 On the one hand, our design creates 
sufficient conditions for generating disappointment. On the other hand, frustration is unlikely to 
appear in our design: subjects ignore they can only receive 4€ or 16€ and they also ignore the exact 
number of clicks required to obtain the endowments. 
In our experiment, disappointment can be captured by observing the satisfaction level reported at 
the first evaluation. If the subject indicates a negative level of satisfaction at the first evaluation, he 
might  express  his  disappointment:  he  is  not  satisfied  with  his  endowment  (he  expects  a  better 
endowment  or  to  perform  better).  On  the  contrary,  if  the  subject  indicates  a  positive  level  of 
satisfaction at the first evaluation, he is ought to indicate his contentment relative to his endowment. 
For a convenient reading, we refer to the term “disappointed subject” in order to represent a subject 
                                                           
34 Disappointment is defined as « the displeasure about the nonoccurrence of a desirable outcome ». Definition 
quoted from van Dijk et al. (1999, p. 205). Frustration is defined as « the act of blocking someone from gaining 




reporting  a  negative  level  of  satisfaction  at  the  first  evaluation  and  we  refer  to  the  term  “not 
disappointed subject” so as to characterise a subject reporting a positive level of satisfaction at the 
first evaluation. 
In order to investigate the implication of disappointment in individual behaviour, we take a look at 
the reduction decisions engaged by subjects according to the first reported level of satisfaction. If 
most  reduction  decisions  result  from  choices  of  subject  reporting  a  negative  value  at  the  first 
evaluation  of  satisfaction,  then  disappointment  can  be  held  responsible  for  leading  subjects  to 
reduce income. Table 17 pictures the number (and proportion) of reduction decisions engaged by 
subjects according to the first reported level of satisfaction. From Table 17, we can observe that 
there  are  significantly  more  reduction  decisions  engaged  by  disappointed  subjects  (i.e.  subjects 
indicating a negative value at the first evaluation of satisfaction) than reduction decisions engaged by 
not disappointed subjects (p < 0.05, two-sample test of proportions). Hence disappointment is ought 
to explain why subjects reduce others’ income. 
Table 17: Number (and proportion) of reduction decisions engaged in Effort according to the first reported level of 
satisfaction. 
  Nb. of reduction decisions   Proportion of reduction decisions 
           19  65.52% 
           10  34.48% 
Total   29  100.0% 
Note:       refers to the satisfaction level reported at the first evaluation of satisfaction.           (resp. 
         ) means that the satisfaction level reported by the player at the first evaluation is negative (resp. 
positive or null). 
If disappointment is involved in reduction decisions engaged by subjects reporting an increase in 
their satisfaction after exposure to social comparison then we would observe that most reduction 
decisions engaged by subjects reporting positive changes in their satisfaction are undertaken by 
subjects reporting a negative value (i.e. disappointed subjects) at the first evaluation of satisfaction. 
Table 18 represents the value (positive, null or negative) of the satisfaction level reported at the first 
evaluation  of  satisfaction  by  subjects  whose  satisfaction  increases  after  exposure  to  social 
comparison. From Table 18, we can observe that most subjects report a negative value at the first 
evaluation: 17 subjects out of 19 (i.e. 89.47%) experience disappointment when they learn their own 
endowment. There are significantly more disappointed subjects than not-disappointed ones (p < 0.05, 
two-sample  test  of  proportions).  Table  18  also  pictures  the  proportion  of  reduction  decisions 
engaged by subjects whose satisfaction increases after exposure to social comparison according to 
the value they give at the first evaluation of satisfaction. When we take a look at the reduction 
decisions engaged by subjects reporting an increase in their satisfaction after exposure to social 




disappointed  subjects  (i.e.  91.0%).  There  are  significantly  more  reduction  decisions  engaged  by 
disappointed subjects than reduction decisions engaged by not disappointed ones (p < 0.05, two-
sample test of proportions). Hence, concerning subjects whose satisfaction increases after learning 
the  opponent’s  endowment,  the  majority  of  reduction  decisions  results  from  decisions  of 
disappointed subjects, i.e. subjects indicating a negative satisfaction level at the first evaluation.
35 We 
find some evidences explaining that disappointment is responsible for leading subjects whose 
satisfaction increases after exposure to social comparison to engage in as many reduction decisio ns 
as subjects experiencing envy.
 36 This hypothesis could also explain why the intensity of destructive 
actions in Effort is positively correlated to the difference measured in relative terms. The higher the 
relative  difference,  the  higher  is  the  gap  between subjects’  performances  and  the  higher  is  the 
disappointment  relative  to  the  subject’s  performance.  The  few  experiments  dealing  with 
disappointment  convey  its  negative  impact  on  subjects,  both  from  an  affective  and  behavioural 
perspective. van Dijk et al. (1999) reported through an experiment that the emotions of regret and 
disappointment were amplified through instrumental effort.
 37 Gill and Prowse (2009) observed that 
disappointment  deterred  second  movers  to  exert  efforts  so  as  to  win  the  competition.  In  our 
experiment,  we  also  observe  a  negative  impact  of  disappointment  on  individual  behaviour: 
disappointed subjects engages in more reduction decisions than others. Then we give partial support 
to H4b. 
   
                                                           
35 We  observe  the  same  significant  result  among  subjects  reporting  no  changes  in  their  satisfaction  after 
exposure to social comparison. Indeed 5 reduction decisions out of 6 (i.e. 83.33%) result from decisions of 
disappointed subjects.  
36 At the end of the experiment subjects were invited to answer to different questions relative to the 
experiment. Among these questions we asked them to indicate the motivations and reasons when evaluating 
their satisfaction. Among subjects that report an increase in their satisfaction, 8 subjects out of 15 answer to 
these questions. Most of them report to  experience disappointment: 4 subjects indicate to  be dissatisfied of 
their performance and 3 subjects write that they expected, before clicking, to receive a higher endowment. 
37 Ortony et al. (1988) disentangled instrumental effort from non-instrumental effort. We quote : “instrumental 
effort pertains to plans (actual or possible) for achieving (or avoiding) states, whereas non-instrumental effort 
pertains to plans (actual or possible) that are related to the state, but are carried out on the assumption that 
the state will be achieved” (p. 73). Consider a student spending hours to revise for an exam. The effort (i.e. 
hours invested in studying) he makes is considered as instrumental since it is associated with a higher likelihood 
of passing the exam. Conversely, imagine that after the exam, he wants to ask a girl for dining out. In this case, 
revising for the exam is considered as a non-instrumental effort since it does not increases the likelihood of 
seducing the girl. In our paper, the clicking task is instrumental since it increases the likelihood of achieving a 




Table  18:  Number  of  subjects  and  reduction  decisions  undertaken  by  subjects  whose  satisfaction  increases  after 
exposure to social comparison according to the value given at the first evaluation of satisfaction. 
  Nb. Observation 
(proportion) 
Nb. Of reduction decisions (proportion) 
           17 (89.47%)  10 (91.0%) 
0 (0.00%) 
1 (9.00%) 
           0 (0.0%) 
           2 (10.53%) 
Total   19 (100.0%)  11 (100.0%) 
Note:       refers to the satisfaction level reported at the first evaluation of satisfaction.           (resp. 
         ) means that the satisfaction level reported by the player at the first evaluation is negative (resp. 
positive).           represents  a  player  whose  satisfaction  does  not  change  after  exposure  to  social 
comparison. 
Can disappointment also explains why subjects reporting negative changes in their satisfaction after 
social comparison choose to reduce their opponent’s endowment? To answer to that question, we 
investigate  within  subjects  whose  satisfaction  decreases  after  exposure  to  social  comparison 
whether  the  majority  of  reduction  decisions  is  undertaken  by  disappointed  subjects.  Table  19 
pictures the proportion of reduction decisions engaged by subjects whose satisfaction decreases 
after  exposure  to  social  comparison  according  to  the  value  they  give  at  the  first  evaluation  of 
satisfaction.  We  observe  that  8  actions  out  of  12  (i.e.  66.67%)  result  from  decisions  of  not 
disappointed subjects. Hence most reduction decisions undertaken by subjects reporting negative 
changes  in  their  satisfaction  are  not  explained  by  disappointment.  Concerning  subjects  whose 
satisfaction  decreases  after  learning  the  opponent’s  endowment,  the  difference  between  the 
proportion of reduction decisions engaged by disappointed subjects is not significantly different from 
the one engaged by not disappointed subjects (p > 0.05, two-sample test of proportions). Besides the 
proportion of reduction decisions engaged by disappointed subjects whose satisfaction increases 
after exposure to social comparison is significantly higher than the proportion of reduction decisions 
engaged by disappointed subjects whose satisfaction decreases after exposure to social comparison 
(p < 0.01, two-sample test of proportions).  
Table  19:  Number  (and  proportion)  of  subjects  and  reduction  decisions  undertaken  by  subjects  whose  satisfaction 
decreases after exposure to social comparison according to the value given at the first evaluation of satisfaction. 
  Nb. Observation (proportion)  Nb. Of reduction decisions 
(proportion) 
           9 (21.95%)  4 (33.33%) 
           1 (2.44%)  0 (0.00%) 
           31 (75.61%)  8 (66.67%) 
Total   41 (100.0%)  12 (100.0%) 
Note:       refers to the satisfaction level reported at the first evaluation of satisfaction.           (resp. 




positive).           represents  a  player  whose  satisfaction  does  not  change  after  exposure  to  social 
comparison. 
Then we find that individual performance is very important in subjects’ decisions to reduce: low 
performance generates disappointment and disappointment pushes some subjects to reduce income 
(see  Result  6).  We  now  observe  who  choose  to  reduce  according  to  individual  effort.  Figure  2 
represents graphically the proportion of reduction decisions engaged according to the direction of 
changes  in  satisfaction  and  to  individual effort.  From  Figure  2,  we observe  that  the majority  of 
subjects  performing  poorly  and  choosing  to  reduce  income  report  positive  changes  in  their 
satisfaction. If we take a look at subjects who reached less than 100 clicks (                ), we 
observe that 41.67% of reduction decisions are undertaken by subjects reporting positive changes in 
their  satisfaction  after  learning  their  opponent’s  endowment  whereas  only  25.0%  of  reduction 
decisions  result  from  decisions of  subjects  indicating  negative  changes  in  their  satisfaction  after 
exposure to social comparison. If we consider better performing subjects, i.e. who reached between 
300 and 400 clicks, we find that 25.0% of reduction decisions are engaged by subjects indicating their 
satisfaction to be positively affected by social comparison whereas 75.0% of reduction decisions are 
engaged  by  subjects  whose  satisfaction  decreases  after  social  comparison.  Concerning  subjects 
reaching more than 400 clicks, all reduction decisions are engaged by subjects whose satisfaction 
decreases after exposure to social comparison. Then as effort increases, the proportion of subjects 
reporting positive changes in satisfaction and reducing the opponent’s endowment decreases. We 
detect the exact opposite effect concerning the proportion of subjects reporting their satisfaction to 
be negatively affected and reducing income. As effort increases the proportion of subjects reporting 
a decrease in their satisfaction and choosing a destructive action increases. Again this observation 
suggests  that  subjects  reporting  their  satisfaction to  be  positively  affected  by  social  comparison 
choose to reduce others’ endowment not because they are motivated by envy but because they are 
disappointed by failing to achieve a better endowment.
 Hence disappointment explains reduction 
decisions among poor performing subjects and envy among high performing ones.
 38  
                                                           
38 Philosophers as well as psychologists claim that envy is more intense in competitive settings. In competitive 
environments, social comparisons are more self-relevant (the desired attribute is very important for subjects: 
all desire to obtain it), subjects share very similar characteristics (goals, aspirations, positions) and the desired 
attribute is limited (only one gold medal, one job). Then envy is ought to be experienced intensively within 









We investigate, through referring on experimental methods, the impact of effort on social emotions 
and more particularly we focus on envy. To fulfil that objective, we implement two treatments: one 
in which subjects have to perform a task to obtain an endowment and one in which they receive 
endowments randomly. Then we expose subjects to unflattering social comparisons and ask them to 
indicate their satisfaction level before and after being exposed to unfavourable social comparison. 
Finally subjects can choose to reduce their opponent’s endowment. Would Iago be more pained if he 
was  less  invested  in  getting  that  promotion?  No,  individual  well-being  is  not  affected  by  how 
endowments  are  attributed:  no  matter  how  endowments  are  attributed,  unflattering  social 
comparisons have the same negative impact on individual well-being. Would Iago be deterred from 
committing crimes if he put fewer efforts in getting that promotion? Yes, if Iago invested no effort in 
getting that promotion his envy would not have exert him to such an extreme issue.  
More precisely, we observe that effort does not affect the impact of social comparisons on subjects’ 
well-being. Indeed whether subjects earn their endowments through effort or no, most of them 
report their satisfaction to be affected and the majority reports a decrease in their satisfaction. 
Besides  the  determinants  of  individual  well-being  are  almost  identical  in  the  two  treatments. 
Furthermore the impact of effort on individual behaviour is partial. We do observe almost the same 
proportion  of  reduction  decisions  whether  endowments  are  attributed  through  effort  or  luck. 






























































opponent's endowment than when endowments depend on luck. Individual performance modulates 
subjects’ decisions to reduce: poor performing subjects are more prone to reduce their opponent's 
endowment than high performing ones. Albeit envy explains why high performing subjects reduce 
others’ income, we find evidences that disappointment might be involved in reduction decisions 
from poor performing subjects.  
To predict behaviour from our experiment, we refer to two different theories: emotion and equity 
theories. Albeit equity theory predicts that if endowments depend on individual effort then subjects 
would  be  less  prone  to  reduce  income,  emotion  theory  predicts  the  exact  opposite  effect.  Our 
experiment tend to corroborate predictions from emotion theory rather than for equity. Indeed we 
find empirical evidences validating the “sense of alteration” theory and observe that subjects cut a 
higher fraction of income through effort.  
Why are poor performing subjects more prone to reduce income than high performing ones? Maybe 
the hypothesis of Perceived Control developed by psychologists might help us in understanding this 
result.  This  hypothesis  refers  to  the  perceived  possibility  for  the  subject  to  obtain  the  desired 
attribute (i.e. subject’s goal). An agent is ought to behave differently when he perceives his objective 
as attainable or very difficult to obtain. More precisely, an agent that perceives his objective to be 
under his range are more prone to experience positive emotions and feelings (e.g. emulation, joy, 
relief) and to behave constructively, i.e. making additional efforts so as to reach his goal. Conversely, 
an agent that perceives his objective to be out of his range is ought to experience negative feelings 
(e.g. envy, sadness, hostility) and to behave destructively, i.e. damaging or destroying the rival’s 
situation.  Testa  and  Major  (1990)  convey  that  subjects  with  pessimistic  beliefs  concerning  the 
possibility to achieve their objectives exhibit more depressive and hostile reactions than those with 
optimistic beliefs. They implemented an experiment in which subjects are informed, after completing 
a task, that they performed poorly. They are exposed to unflattering social comparisons by learning 
other  participants’  higher  performance.  Some  subjects  are  told  that  they  could  improve  their 
performance (high control condition) whereas other could not (low control condition). Subjects were 
then asked to report their subjective feelings. Testa and Major (1990) convey empirical evidences 
that Perceived Control modulates subjects’ depressive and hostile reactions: subjects from the low 
control condition exhibit significantly more depressive and hostile reactions than subjects from the 
high control condition (see also Lockwood and Kunda, 1997). 
Our  study  provides  interesting  results  that  could  be  used  in  management  when  designing  new 
incentive  schemes,  in  team  management  or  more  generally  in  human  resources.  Indeed  the 




(Bedeian , 1995; Vecchio, 2005; Vidaillet, 2007, 2008). Indeed it provides a great number of relevant 
social comparisons involving individuals that share similar characteristics and job aspirations. Besides, 
by assigning limited organizational resources, it also generates inequalities among co-workers: wages, 
job promotions, windowed offices, secretarial support, company cars... Employees’ performance is 
not observable in all firms. When employees’ performance is observable it is very easy for managers 
to propose wages that depend on individual performance but when performance is not observable, 
managers propose wages relying on factors that are beyond employees’ control (e.g. manager’s 
beliefs about employee’s performance, employee’s physical attractiveness...). Employees’ reactions 
are ought to be very different in these two settings. Which configuration minimises the probability 
for an employee to engage in negative behaviour (e.g. deter job atmosphere, sabotage…) toward co-
workers? Thanks to our paper, we can offer an answer to this issue. 
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Thank you for accepting to participate in this experiment. This experiment is paid for real and lasts 
about half an hour. Your final payoff will depend on your endowment and on your decisions or on 
decisions of other participants, depending on your role. All decisions are anonymous and there are 
neither good nor bad answers. All amounts will be directly expressed in Euros. You will learn your 
final payoff at the end of the experiment and it will be paid for real in cash. If you have, during the 
experiment, any question, raise your hand and a monitor will come to answer you privately. 
In that experiment, we distinguish two roles: role of player A and role of player B. From now when 
speaking about a player who received the role A, we will refer to player A and to player B for a player 
who received the role B. Roles are fixed during the whole experiment and are randomly attributed by 
the  computer.  There  are  as  many  players  A  as  there  are  players  B.  Each  player  A  is  randomly 
associated to a player B. Whatever your role you are always associated with the same player. The 
computer is going randomly to allocate an endowment for each player. Possible endowments range 
from 4 Euros (minimum endowment) to 32 Euros (maximum endowment). Only players A are going 
to take a decision. Players B have no decision to take and are invited to remain silent during the 
experiment. 
After each participant has finished reading instructions, the computer will randomly attribute the 
roles. Your role will be displayed on the screen. Then players A will be invited to take a decision, 
which is going to be explained after, while players B will wait. Once all players A have indicated their 
decision, then all players (players A and B) will be informed of their final payoff.  








Thank you for accepting to participate in this experiment. This experiment is paid for real and lasts 
about half an hour. Your final payoff will depend on your endowment and on your decisions or on 
decisions of other participants, depending on your role. All decisions are anonymous and there are 
neither good nor bad answers. All amounts will be directly expressed in Euros. You will learn your 
final payoff at the end of the experiment and it will be paid for real in cash. If you have, during the 
experiment, any question, raise your hand and a monitor will come to answer you privately. 
In that experiment, we distinguish two roles: role of player A and role of player B. From now when 
speaking about a player who received the role A, we will refer to player A and to player B for a player 
who received the role B. Roles are fixed during the whole experiment and are randomly attributed by 
the computer.  There are as many players A as there are players B. Each player A is randomly 
associated to a player B. Whatever your role you are always associated with the same player.  
Each player whatever his role is going to receive an endowment. Possible endowments range from 4 
Euros  (minimum  endowment)  to  32  Euros  (maximum  endowment).  Endowments  are  attributed 
according to the number of clicks made by each player. More precisely, each player from both roles 
has one minute to click using his mouse. The higher the number of clicks made by a player, the higher 
his endowment. Then the attribution of endowments only depends on the number of clicks made by 
each player. There is a minimum number of clicks required for each endowment possible. The higher 
the endowment, the higher the number of clicks required to obtain that endowment. No player from 
this experiment is informed about the exact number of clicks required for each endowment.  
 Only players A are going to take a decision. Players B have no decision to take and are invited to 
remain silent during the experiment. 
After each participant has finished reading instructions, the computer will randomly attribute the 
roles. Your role will be displayed on the screen. After being informed of your role, you will have one 
minute to click using your mouse. Then players A will be invited to take a decision, which is going to 
be explained after, while players B will wait. Once all players A have indicated their decision, then all 
players (players A and B) will be informed of their final payoff.  












Appendix D: Screenshot relative to the evaluation of satisfaction. 




Appendix E: Screenshot relative to reduction decisions. 
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